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Abstract
In three experiments, children aged between 3 and 5 years (N = 38, 52, 94; mean ages 3–7 to 5–2) indicated
their confidence in their knowledge of the identity of a hidden toy. With the exception of some 3-year-olds,
children revealed working understanding of their knowledge source by showing high confidence when
they had seen or felt the toy, and lower confidence when they had been told its identity by an apparently
well-informed speaker. Correct explicit source reports were not necessary for children to show relative
uncertainty when the speaker subsequently doubted the adequacy of his access to the toy. After a 2-min
delay, 3–4-year-olds, unlike 4–5-year-olds, failed to see the implications of the speaker’s doubt about his
access.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The ability to recall or infer how we know something is crucially important for assessing the
accuracy of our knowledge (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Linsday, 1993). Suppose a companion on a
country walk reports spotting an unusual bird that I failed to notice. I have no reason to doubt
her, and so I believe that this particular bird was indeed in the area. However, that evening my
companion mentions that she was not wearing her glasses on the walk. If I recollect that she
was the source of my belief about the bird’s presence, I might now be less sure of its truth: I
thought she had seen the bird adequately to identify it and differentiate it from a more common
variety, but now I find that she had not. In contrast, if I do not recollect how my belief was
∗ Corresponding author.
0885-2014/$ – see front matter © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2007.05.001
106 E.J. Robinson et al. / Cognitive Development 23 (2008) 105–118
acquired, I will draw no such implication from her comment about the missing glasses. I will
continue to treat my belief as factually true. Importantly, this kind of source-identification and
evaluation allows adults to keep a check on the likely truth of their knowledge even in the absence of
contradicting information. Note that in this example I had no independent information that the bird
was not present, but nevertheless I had good grounds for reducing my confidence in my belief that
it was.
The need to engage in such source identification and evaluation arises early in childhood. As
children’s mastery of language increases, they need skills to assess the likely truth of what they
are told in order to benefit fully from other people’s experience of the world. This holds not just
at the time of originally hearing an utterance, but also, as in the example above, subsequently,
once the information conveyed has become part of their own knowledge base. Without such skills,
children will be at risk of believing what is false or disbelieving what is true.
In the research reported here, we examined how 3–5-year-old children behave in circumstances
similar to the example above. A speaker appeared to have seen a hidden toy before telling the
child its color, or to have felt before telling the child whether it was hard or soft. After the child
believed what she was told, the speaker doubted that he had felt it or looked properly. Would
children realise that his doubt had specific implications for the likely truth of their belief, even
though they had no independent evidence that their belief might be false?
Previous research does not tell us the answer, nor even give clear indications about what to
expect. We know a good deal about young children’s decisions about whether or not to believe what
they are told at the time they first hear it, but very little about how this knowledge is subsequently
treated. For example, research on word learning shows that many 4-year-olds, and under some
conditions 3-year-olds, are sensitive to a speaker’s past mislabelling and to a speaker’s assertion
of her own ignorance when they decide whether or not to believe that speaker’s naming of a new
unfamiliar object (Birch & Bloom, 2002; Koenig, Clement, & Harris, 2004; Koenig & Harris,
2005; Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001). Similarly, children’s decisions to believe what they are told
about features of the physical world reveal early competence under some conditions. Both 3- and
4-year-olds show sensitivity to a speaker’s perceptual access to a hidden toy when they decide
whether or not to believe that speaker’s assertion about its identity (Robinson & Whitcombe, 2003;
Whitcombe & Robinson, 2000). For example, children were asked to guess the color of a hidden
toy after having only felt it (e.g., “It’s the red one”), and the speaker then gave a contradicting
suggestion (e.g., “It’s the blue one”). Children believed this contradicting suggestion when the
speaker was better informed than they were, having seen the toy. In contrast, they were equally
likely to believe or disbelieve the suggestion when both they and the speaker had only felt the toy.
These studies show that children are sensitive to a speaker’s current perceptual access, as well as
her past history, when deciding whether to believe what they are told.
We do not know, however, how children subsequently treat beliefs acquired from others. Do
they retain any information that those beliefs were gained indirectly rather than directly? Between
the ages of 3 and 5 years substantial improvements occur in children’s ability to report the
source of knowledge recently acquired (e.g., Gopnik & Graf, 1988; O’Neill & Gopnik, 1991;
Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Perner, 1988). However, explicit source reports might be neither necessary
nor sufficient for children to show appropriate uncertainty when a speaker’s informedness is called
into question. For example, children who can accurately report “I know because you told me,”
may not realise the implications of the speaker being less well informed than originally appeared
to be the case. On the other hand, children who cannot report explicitly that the speaker was
the source of their knowledge might nevertheless demonstrate working understanding of their
knowledge source.
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In the experiments reported here, children found out which one of a pair of toys was hidden
in a tunnel, either from their own direct experience or from a cooperative and apparently well-
informed experimenter. In both cases, the experimenter subsequently expressed doubts about
the adequacy of his own access to the hidden toy. This doubt had implications for the truth of
the child’s knowledge only when it had been gained from him: Children should now be unsure
about the target toy’s identity, on the basis of reasoning “I believed what you said because you
appeared to be well-informed; if after all you were not well-informed, what you said might or
might not be true.” In contrast, when knowledge was gained by seeing or feeling the toy directly,
children should still be certain of the hidden toy’s identity even after the experimenter expressed
doubt about his own access. In Experiment 1, we found out whether or not children differentiated
between these two conditions.
If they did differentiate, and were more uncertain when they had relied on the experimenter
for their knowledge of the toy’s identity, there could be two explanations. The strong explanation
is that they reasoned in the way specified above, seeing the specific implications of the speaker’s
doubt about his access. This would imply that they could not only identify the source of their
own knowledge (being told by the experimenter vs. feeling or seeing for themselves), but also
identified the experimenter’s source of knowledge when they had relied on him, and saw the
connection between that source of knowledge being less well accessed than they thought, and the
reliability of their own knowledge.
On the other hand, there could be a weaker explanation for differentiation between conditions
(i.e., if children are more uncertain when they relied on the experimenter for their knowledge of
the toy’s identity than when they found out for themselves). Knowledge gained indirectly from
another person might by default be held more tentatively than knowledge gained directly. Perner
(1991) argues that from their earliest days, children must be more sceptical of what they are
told about the world than of their own direct experience; otherwise their knowledge base would
be unstable. An automatic process that is sensitive to whether information is gained directly or
from a speaker’s utterance could be considered to involve some kind of source monitoring on a
rudimentary level, but would be less sophisticated than the source identification and evaluation
involved if implications are drawn from the speaker’s doubt about his own access.
In Experiment 2, we tested these weak and strong explanations for children’s uncertainty in
knowledge gained from a speaker, either or both of which could be correct. Children might by
default be uncertain of knowledge gained indirectly, but also engage in the complex analysis
outlined under the strong explanation. Our main interest was in establishing whether the strong
explanation held, but we were also interested in whether or not there was evidence for the weak
explanation.
2. Experiment 1
We aimed to find out whether children aged 3 and 4 years were less confident in knowledge
gained from an apparently well-informed speaker who subsequently doubted his access, than in
knowledge gained directly by seeing or feeling, without yet committing ourselves to the strong or
the weak explanation. We also examined how children’s relative confidence in knowledge gained
directly or indirectly related to their ability to report explicitly when their knowledge was gained
from the experimenter. As noted earlier, children who can report explicitly that the experimenter
was the source of their knowledge might nevertheless fail to see the implications of his expressed
doubt about his access. On the other hand, children who cannot offer explicit source reports might
reveal a working understanding sufficient to realise these implications.
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2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
The final sample consisted of 38 children (19 girls): 25 4-year-olds from reception classes, in
their first year of formal schooling (range 4–0 to 5–0, mean 4–6) and 13 3-year-olds from nursery
classes (range 3–2 to 4–0, mean 3–7). All children in this and subsequent experiments attended
schools serving predominantly White working and middle-class areas of mid- and northern U.K.
An additional six children were excluded, two of whom replied “Yes” to all questions on the four
experimental trials and four of whom failed to repeat the experimenter’s well-informed suggestion
on at least one of the tell trials (and so, as explained below, were not asked the subsequent doubt
or source questions).
2.1.2. Materials
We used a tunnel (15 cm × 15 cm × 35 cm) open at both ends, with a window in one side. The
window and both ends of the tunnel had opaque curtains that could be lifted to allow viewing
through the window, or an arm to enter either end. We used eight pairs of toys (e.g., stylised cats,
lions, bears and frogs). One toy in each pair felt soft and the other felt hard, but the two looked
the same, so children could not identify which toy it was just by looking. A glove puppet, Mole,
operated by the experimenter using a distinctive voice, asked some of the test questions. A bag
was used to contain toys while they were concealed in the tunnel.
2.1.3. Design and procedure
In a within-subjects design, children received two warm-up trials (to be described) followed
by four experimental trials. The experimental trials comprised of two source trials that tested
children’s explicit source identification, and two doubt trials that assessed children’s ability to
identify and evaluate knowledge sources in working understanding. On one doubt trial and one
source trial, children gained knowledge from the apparently well-informed experimenter (tell
trials, in which children believed what they were told) and on the others, they gained knowledge
from their own direct experience (direct trials).
The procedure on doubt trials was as follows (see Table 1). Stages (i)–(iv) served only to lead
children to gain knowledge either directly or from the experimenter. This part of the procedure was
heavily based on previous work (Robinson & Whitcombe, 2003; Whitcombe & Robinson, 2000)
but further checks were made in a preliminary study using this specific procedure.1 The novel part
of the procedure, where the experimenter expressed doubt about his access, occurs at stage (v):
(i) The child was introduced to a pair of toys and agreed on their properties. Both toys were
placed in the bag, shaken, and one toy was slipped from the bag into the tunnel apparently
without anyone knowing which one. In fact, the experimenter (SH) discreetly identified the
toy.
1 In a preliminary study (N = 87 children aged 3–5 and 4–4, mean age 4–0) we checked that children were sensitive to
the experimenter’s information access. Children were more likely to repeat the experimenter’s suggestion when he was
well informed (e.g., he had felt the toy to identify its hardness) and they were not (e.g., they had seen the toy) than when
both child and experimenter were poorly informed (e.g., both had seen the toy to identify its hardness). Children repeated
the experimenter’s suggestion on a mean of 1.61 trials of 2 (s.d. = .60) when he was well informed, but on 1.23 trials (.62)











Procedure for Experiment 1
Doubt trials Source trials
(i) Properties of toys identified. One toy is hidden in the tunnel.
(ii) Speaker feels (tell trials) or looks (direct trials).
Speaker correctly identifies
target on both tell and
direct trials.
Speaker correctly identifies
target on tell trials but
misidentifies on direct trials.
(iii) Child sees (tell trials) or looks (direct trials).
(iv) Child is asked, “Which one is inside, please?”
(v) Doubt question: “I’m not
sure I felt/looked properly.
Could it be the [other one]?”
Source question: “Did you find
out it was the hard/soft one
because I told you, yes or no?”
(vi) Toy is removed from tunnel to check its identity.
Note. Source trials assess explicit source identification. Doubt Trials assess identification and evaluation of knowledge sources in working understanding.
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(ii) The experimenter said, “Now I’m going to look/feel inside and tell you which toy I think is
inside.” He then either looked at or felt the toy in the tunnel, and identified it correctly, for
example “the soft cat.”
(iii) The child was then invited to look at (when the experimenter had felt) or feel (when the
experimenter had looked) the toy inside the tunnel.
(iv) The puppet Mole then asked the child an identity question, “Which one is inside please?”
On direct trials, the child had felt the toy and could answer this identity question correctly
on the basis of her own direct experience. On tell trials, the child had seen the toy but
could answer the identity question correctly by relying on the experimenter’s suggestion,
since he had felt it. If the child’s identity judgment on a tell trial was not in line with the
experimenter’s suggestion, the trial was terminated (see Section 2.1.1 above for exclusions).
The great majority of children repeated the experimenter’s suggestion and continued.
(v) The experimenter-doubted the reliability of his access, saying, “I’m not sure I looked/felt
inside properly” followed by the doubt question: “Could it be the [other toy]?”
(vi) After the child’s response, the child and experimenter removed the toy from the tunnel to
check its identity. Children always found out that the experimenter had in fact given the
correct identity judgment, so there was no accumulating evidence of unreliability when the
experimenter had appeared to be well informed, despite his assertions of doubt.
The procedure on source trials began in a similar way (see Table 1). The experimenter either
saw or felt the toy and told the child which one he thought it was, but on source trials when
the experimenter saw the toy he gave the wrong identity judgment, so that the experimenter was
not a correct source of the child’s knowledge. The child then felt the toy and could identify it
correctly. Mole then asked the identity question as on doubt trials. Stage (v) of the procedure
was different: Instead of expressing doubt, the experimenter assessed children’s ability to report
the source of their knowledge: “So, you found out it was the [hard/soft] one. Did you find out it
was the hard/soft one because I told you, yes or no?” (the source question). This two-sentence
structure allowed children to follow their inclination to assent to the content of their belief (it’s
the hard one) but then to focus on the question about its source (did you find out because . . .). As
on doubt trials, source trials ended with child and experimenter checking the toy’s identity, and
this time the child discovered that the experimenter had been wrong when he had only seen the
toy, so there was no accumulation of evidence that the experimenter was always correct despite
being poorly informed.
The classic source question used in the published literature is “How do you know . . .?” How-
ever, to use this question here might make an unfair comparison with the question “Could it be
the [other toy]?” which demands a response of only “Yes” or “No”. We therefore used a source
question that demanded only “Yes” or “No” in response.
To encourage children to attend to the experimenter’s mode of obtaining knowledge (by see-
ing or feeling the toy) and to see its relevance, two warm-up trials (one direct and one tell) at
the beginning of the game followed a similar format up to stage (iv) but included explanatory
comments. On the direct trial, the experimenter (poorly informed) made the incorrect suggestion
and pointed out at the end of the trial that he had been wrong. On the tell trial, the experimenter
(well-informed) gave the correct suggestion and pointed out at the end of the trial that he had
been right. Warm-up trials ended after children had made their identity judgment and checked its
accuracy by taking the target toy out of the tunnel. The order of the four experimental trials was
counterbalanced and cycled between children, as were forced-choice responses of “yes” and “no”
for the source and belief revision questions.
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2.2. Results and discussion
2.2.1. Responses to doubt question
The doubt question “Could it be the [other toy]?” tested children’s confidence in the toy’s
identity after the speaker doubted his own perceptual access. A response of “Yes” (it could be
the other toy) was taken to indicate lack of confidence in the toy’s identity, and “No” to indicate
confidence. If children realised the implications of the speaker’s doubt about his own perceptual
access, they should be less certain on the tell trial (when children were told the toy’s identity
by the experimenter) than on the direct trial (children’s knowledge came from their own direct
experience).
On the direct trial, children were confident in the toy’s identity: 37 of 38 (97%) children
responded “No” (it could not be the other toy). One 3-year-old child responded “Yes.” On the tell
trial, children were less certain: Only 16 children of 38 (42%) responded “No,” while 22 (58%)
responded “Yes”, accepting that it could be the other toy. Dividing the sample by age revealed
that only the 4-year-olds were significantly more likely to say “No” on the direct than on the tell
trial: Amongst 4-year-olds who responded differently in the two trials, 17 said “No” on the direct
trial only and “Yes” on the tell trial, whereas no child showed the opposite pattern of responding:
McNemar χ2 (N = 25) p < .001. The 3-year-olds in contrast showed no significant differentiation
between direct and tell trials: The equivalent frequencies were 4 and 0. The 3-year-olds who said
“No” on the direct trial were more likely than the 4-year-olds to also say “No” on the tell trial: 8
of 12 3-year-olds did so, compared with 8 of 25 4-year-olds, χ2 (d.f. = 1, N = 37) = 3.97, p = .046.
These 3-year-olds showed over-confidence in knowledge gained from the experimenter.
2.2.2. Responses to source question
Children were asked, “Did you find out it was the [hard/soft] one because I told you?” The
correct pattern of responding to the source question was “No” on the direct trial, when children had
felt the object for themselves, and “Yes” (I do know because you told me) on the tell trial. Eighteen
of the 38 children (47%) showed this pattern (1 of 13 3-year-olds and 17 of 25 4-year-olds). Most
of the remaining responses were “Yes” on both trials (11 3-year-olds and 8 4-year-olds): A “Yes”
bias is not unexpected from children who simply did not know how they knew which toy was in
the tunnel.
2.2.3. Relationship between responses to doubt and source questions
For each question, children were scored as passing when they said “No” (it couldn’t be the
other one OR you didn’t tell me) on the direct trial (when they had found out for themselves) and
“Yes” on the tell trial (when they had relied on the experimenter). All other response patterns were
scored as failures. There was a significant relation for the sample as a whole between performance
on the two tasks: 15 children passed both, 13 failed both, 6 passed only the doubt question and 4
passed only the source question: χ2 (d.f. = 1, N = 38) = 8.62, p = .003. Breaking down by age, the
equivalent frequencies for the 4-year-olds were 14; 5; 3; 3: χ2 (d.f. = 1, N = 25) = 5.029, p = .025.
Most of the 3-year-olds failed both tasks, making statistical analysis unreliable. The equivalent
frequencies were 1; 8; 3; 1.
Despite the significant association between children’s ability to make explicit whether they
had gained their knowledge from the experimenter, and their showing the appropriate pattern of
confidence in knowledge gained directly and indirectly, there was some indication that children
performed better at doubt than at source judgments. Children who failed to show the correct pattern
of “Yes” and “No” judgments on the source questions (N = 19), nevertheless differentiated as a
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group between direct and tell trials in their answers to the doubt question: six children correctly
said “No” (it could not be the other one) on the direct trial and “Yes” (it could be the other
one) on the tell trial, whereas no child showed the opposite pattern of responding: McNemar χ2
(N = 19) p = .03. That is, correct explicit source reports were not necessary for children to show
relative uncertainty in knowledge gained on tell trials. In contrast, children who failed to show the
correct pattern of “Yes” and “No” judgments in answer to the doubt questions (N = 17), showed no
differentiation between direct and tell trials in their answers to the source question: three correctly
said “Yes” to the source question (Did you find out because I told you?) on the tell trial only,
compared with none who incorrectly said “Yes” on the direct trial only. That is, there was no sign
that children could report their knowledge source explicitly yet fail to be less certain of knowledge
gained on tell trials than on direct trials.
Taking all the results together, younger children were often over-confident in knowledge gained
from the experimenter, frequently denying that it could be the other toy in the tunnel, and showing
no differentiation between tell and direct trials in their responses to the doubt question. Some
children who did differentiate between tell and direct trials in their responses to the doubt question,
nevertheless revealed no explicit understanding of their knowledge sources. Finally, some children
both differentiated between direct and tell trials in response to the doubt question, and also showed
explicit understanding in response to the source questions. The current data do not allow us to
argue that these three response patterns form a developmental sequence, but it is plausible that
they do. A similar sequence has been identified in work on implicit understanding of false belief:
Some 3-year-olds who fail a standard false belief test that demands verbally explicit understanding
show eye movements suggesting implicit understanding, but younger children’s eye movements
do not (Clements & Perner, 1994; Ruffman, Garnham, Import, & Connolly, 2001).
The results show the basic effect of interest: Less certainty in knowledge gained from the
experimenter on tell trials than in knowledge gained directly. This is the minimum effect needed
to argue that children realised that the experimenter’s doubt about his access had implications
for the likely truth of their belief only when they had relied on what the experimenter told them.
However, as pointed out earlier we cannot yet be sure whether this strong explanation is justified.
We find that out in Experiment 2.
3. Experiment 2
In experiment 2, we examined the basis of children’s greater uncertainty about the toy’s identity
when they had relied on the speaker. We tested the strong and weak explanations specified earlier.
According to the strong explanation, children reasoned in line with “I believed what you said
because you appeared to be well-informed; if after all you were not well-informed, what you said
might or might not be true.” According to the weak explanation, they are by default less confident
in knowledge gained indirectly from others than in knowledge gained directly. They thus would
be relatively uncertain of the toy’s identity on tell trials even if no doubt was cast on the adequacy
of the speaker’s access to the toy.
To find out whether the strong explanation holds, we need a condition in which children find
out the toy’s identity from a speaker, but no doubt is subsequently expressed about the adequacy of
the speaker’s access to the toy. If children are just as unsure of the toy’s identity whether or not the
speaker’s access is called into question, we cannot accept the strong explanation. In Experiment 2,
we introduced such a condition. The observing puppet mole-doubted the identity of the hidden toy
without doubting the experimenter’s access and without giving any other reason. We compared
children’s responses to the doubt question on tell trials (when children’s knowledge of the toy’s
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identity came from what they were told) under this new condition and under the original condition
used previously, when the experimenter-doubted his access. If children more frequently accepted
that it could be the other toy following the experimenter’s doubt about his access rather than
Mole’s doubt about the toy’s identity, this would be consistent with the strong explanation.
The Mole condition also allowed us to test whether the weak explanation held, by comparing
direct trials (children knew the toy’s identity from their own experience) vs. tell trials (children
knew from being told). If children were less confident when mole-doubted the toy’s identity on
tell trials than on direct trials, this outcome would suggest that children by default hold as tentative
knowledge gained from utterances compared with knowledge gained directly, even if there is no
particular reason to doubt the speaker’s reliability.
We could find either or both of these effects. For example, children might by default be
uncertain about knowledge gained from a speaker (evidenced by greater uncertainty on tell than
on direct trials when mole-doubts the toy’s identity), but in addition see the specific implications
of the speaker’s doubt about his access (evidenced by greater uncertainty on tell trials when the
experimenter-doubts his access than when mole-doubts the toy’s identity).
In Experiment 2 we used the doubt question used in Experiment 1. We also included trials with
a brief delay between the children identifying the hidden toy and the doubt question. We were
interested in whether children suffered a loss of source specifying information over this short
delay (Pillow & Anderson, 2006). If they did, then any differentiation on tell trials between mole
and experimenter-doubt conditions might be lost, and children might also lose differentiation
between direct and tell trials. Finally, with the aim of finding ceiling or near-ceiling performance,
we included a sample of older children aged between 4 and 5 years.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
We report data from 94 children. Fifty-five children were from nursery classes (35 girls, age
range 3–4 to 4–9, mean 4–2). Thirty-nine children were in a reception class in their first year of
formal schooling (23 girls, age range 4–8 to 5–7, mean 5–2). An additional six children were not
included because they failed to repeat the experimenter’s well-informed suggestion on at least
one of the tell trials and so were not asked the subsequent doubt questions.
3.1.2. Materials
We used pairs of toys that differed in color only. For the trials involving a delay between the
child’s identity judgment and the belief revision question, we prepared outline drawings of the
toy pairs for children to color in.
3.1.3. Design and procedure
In a mixed design, children entered either the experimenter-doubt or the mole-doubt condition.
Each child had one direct and one tell trial with no delay between the identity judgment and the
doubt question, as in Experiments 1 and 2. Each child also had one direct and one tell trial with
a delay of approximately 2 min between the child giving her identity judgment and the doubt
question.
The procedure followed stages (i)–(iv) as described in Experiment 1 except that seeing rather
than feeling was informative. On the delay trials, after the child had made an identity judgment,
the experimenter moved the tunnel out of the child’s reach leaving the toy hidden inside and
presented the child with outline drawings of the toy pair in question and appropriately colored
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crayons. After approximately 2 min when children had finished their coloring or were at a suit-
able point to be interrupted, they were asked to recall which toy they had said was inside the
tunnel. Only children who responded correctly continued with the remaining procedure on that
trial.
Children then entered experimenter-doubt or mole-doubt conditions alternately. For children
in the mole-doubt condition, Mole said, for example, “I’m not sure it’s the (red cat)” followed by
the doubt question: “Could it be the (blue cat)?” For the 3–4-year-olds in the experimenter-doubt
condition, the experimenter-doubted his access as at stage (v) of the procedure in Experiment 1 and
then asked the doubt question. In pilot work, some 4–5-year-olds responded to the experimenter’s
doubt that he might not have looked or felt properly by reassuring him that such an error was
very unlikely. Therefore, for the 4–5-year-olds only, in the experimenter-doubt condition, the
experimenter used the same wording as Mole, doubting the toy’s identity without giving a reason.
This modification resulted in the older children receiving less clear-cut clues to help their source
monitoring, as compared with the younger ones, and so if anything risked underestimating their
abilities.
We also included two filler trials to ensure that the experimenter was not always correct. Again,
comments made by children in pilot work suggested the need for different filler trials for two age
groups. Children of both ages experienced the experimenter giving an incorrect identity judgment
when he was poorly informed and the older children additionally experienced themselves being
wrong when poorly informed. For the 3 to 4-year-olds, the child guessed the toy’s identity correctly
and the experimenter guessed incorrectly. For 4 to 5-year-olds, both the child and experimenter
guessed the toy’s identity incorrectly. The experimenter managed the content of the tunnel to
ensure this outcome. The order of the four experimental trials (two direct and two tell, two delay
and two no delay) was completely counterbalanced between children. The two filler trials always
appeared at the second and fourth trial positions.
3.2. Results
Frequencies of “No” judgments in response to the doubt question appear in Table 2. Recall
that on tell trials, children’s knowledge of the toy’s identity came from what they were told,
and on direct trials, it came from their own direct experience. We were interested in testing the
strong explanation—Did children see the specific implications of the speaker’s doubt about his
access (evidenced by greater uncertainty on tell trials when the experimenter-doubted his access
than when mole-doubted the toy’s identity)—and the weak explanation—Are children by default
uncertain about knowledge gained from a speaker (evidenced by greater uncertainty on tell than
direct trials when mole-doubted the toy’s identity).
Table 2
Percentage of “No” responses to the doubt question (Experiment 2)
Age group Mole-doubt condition Experimenter-doubt condition
Direct Tell Direct Tell
No delay 3–4 years 81% 58% 83% 24%
4–5 years 100% 61% 100% 29%
Delay 3–4 years 70% 43% 71% 42%
4–5 years 93% 67% 85% 29%
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3.2.1. Responses to doubt questions with no delay
As in the previous experiments, a response of “No” to the question “Could it be the [other
toy]?” was interpreted as indicating certainty in the identity of the hidden toy. The results shown
in Table 2 suggest that results are in line with both the weak and the strong explanations.
To test the weak explanation, we compared the frequency of “No” responses to the doubt
question on direct trials and tell trials in the mole-doubt condition. McNemar tests showed there
was a near significantly or significantly lower incidence of “No” judgments on tell than on direct
trials in the mole-doubt condition: 3 to 4-year-olds [N = 26] p = .07; 4 to 5-year-olds (N = 18)
p = .016. That is, for the older children at least, there appeared to be a default reduced confidence
in knowledge gained from the experimenter. As expected, we also found the same effect in
the experimenter-doubt condition: 3 to 4-year-olds (N = 29) p < .001—for 4 to 5-year-olds no
calculation was made due to 100% on direct trials. This replicates the results of Experiment 1.
Consistent with the strong explanation, under no-delay conditions on tell trials there was a lower
incidence of “No” judgments in the experimenter-doubt than in the mole-doubt condition for—3
to 4-year-olds χ2 (d.f. = 1, N = 55) = 6.43, p = .011; for 4 to 5-year-olds χ2 (d.f. = 1, N = 39) = 4.17,
p = .041. That is, on tell trials when the experimenter-doubted his own access, children were less
certain of the identity of the toy than when mole-doubted the toy’s identity for no good reason.
Importantly, children differentiated between the two doubt conditions (Mole vs. experimenter) on
tell trials only. Had they also differentiated on direct trials, this would have suggested that for some
reason children were simply more likely to acquiesce to the doubt question when it was asked
by the experimenter rather than Mole. The pattern of judgments obtained suggests that children
realised that they had believed the experimenter because he appeared to be well informed; if he
was not, their belief about the toy’s identity might not be true.
3.2.2. Responses to doubt questions with delay
After the two-minute delay, it could have been that information about sources of the information
was lost, and that as a consequence children became overly confident on tell trials, just as the
sample of 3-year-olds in Experiment 1 were on no-delay trials. However, as shown in Table 2,
children in both age groups held their belief about the toy’s identity more tentatively on tell trials
than on direct trials.
The 4 to 5-year-olds continued to differentiate between direct and tell trials in the experimenter-
doubt condition, as in the no delay conditions in Experiments 1 and 2: They showed a significantly
lower incidence of “No” judgments on tell trial than on direct trial, (N = 20), p = .001. They also
showed the additional pattern of responses necessary to support the strong explanation for this
uncertainty. They showed a lower incidence of “No” judgments on tell trials in the experimenter-
doubt than in the mole-doubt condition, χ2 (d.f. = 1, N = 39) = 5.66, p = .017. However, support
for the weak explanation was not found. There was no significant difference in the mole-doubt
condition in the frequency of “No” judgments on direct and tell trials, (N = 15), p = .13.
The 3 to 4-year-olds also showed a significantly lower incidence of “No” judgments on tell
than on direct trials in the experimenter-doubt condition, (N = 26), p = .039. However, unlike the
older children, the 3 to 4-year-olds showed no sign of differentiation between experimenter-doubt
and mole-doubt conditions on tell trials, with 42% “No” responses on the former and 43% on the
latter (see Table 2). Hence, support for the strong explanation was lost. On the other hand, the 3 to
4-year-olds did show support for the weak explanation for uncertainty in knowledge gained from
the experimenter: In the mole-doubt condition there were significantly fewer “No” judgments on
tell trials than on direct trials, (N = 21), p = .039.
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The important findings from this experiment are as follows: (i) On no delay trials, children were
less confident about knowledge gained indirectly from utterances than about knowledge gained
directly, even when no doubt was expressed about the adequacy of the speaker’s access to the
hidden toy (mole-doubt condition). This is in line with the weak explanation for uncertainty about
knowledge gained from others. (ii) Over and above this uncertainty, on no-delay trials children
realised the specific implications of the speaker’s doubt about his access, as if reasoning “. . . if
you were not well informed, my belief could be false,” in line with the strong explanation. (iii)
After a delay, there was some loss of source information amongst the younger children. Although
they remained less certain in knowledge gained indirectly, they failed to reveal understanding of
the specific implications of the speaker’s doubt about his access to the toy.
4. General discussion and conclusions
As children’s increasing mastery of language allows them to learn from other people’s knowl-
edge and experience, they need skills to evaluate the likely truth of what they are told. The findings
reported here add to the evidence that many 3- and 4-year-olds are well equipped to benefit from
what other people tell them and can guard against the risks associated with learning from others.
The findings also add to our knowledge of children’s source-monitoring skills, suggesting that
working understanding of sources of knowledge can help children evaluate the likely truth of their
knowledge, even if they cannot yet report explicitly its source.
We already knew, and we confirmed in the experiments reported here, that 3- and 4-year-old
children can take into account speakers’ mode of information access when deciding whether or not
to believe what is said. For example, they believed what they were told about a hidden toy’s color
only when the speaker had seen it and not when he or she had felt it. The new findings concern
the weight that children subsequently give to this knowledge. When doubts were expressed about
the speaker’s access, 3 to 4-year-olds (mean ages 4–1 and 4–2 in Experiment 1) and 4 to 5-year-
olds (Experiment 2) continued to hold the knowledge gained with appropriate caution, at least
in the short term. For example, they often accepted that the toy’s color could have been different
when their knowledge came from the speaker, but rarely did so when they had seen the toy for
themselves.
Experiment 2 showed that this uncertainty in knowledge gained from others had two distinct
bases. First, we found evidence of a default lack of confidence in knowledge gained indirectly,
possibly based on an automatic process involving source monitoring on an implicit level. Even
when no doubt was expressed about the speaker’s access to the toy, but instead Mole expressed
doubt about the target toy’s identity without giving a reason, children were less confident about the
toy’s identity when their knowledge came from the experimenter than when they had found out for
themselves. We describe this as the “weak” explanation for uncertainty, because it could be based
simply on automatic processes (Perner, 1991), but this is not to imply it is uninteresting. It could
have been that having decided to believe what they were told, children then held knowledge so
gained with just as much confidence as if it had been gained directly unless they had good reason
to question it, as they did when the speaker doubted his access. This is a plausible expectation,
given the widely held assumption in the published literature that young children fail to understand
the sources of their knowledge (e.g., Harris, 2002). Yet it turned out not to be the case at least
with our procedure.
One interesting possibility is that results differ for different kinds of knowledge. In our task,
the experimenter merely acted as a proxy for the child. Had the child experienced the same
visual or tactile access to the target toy as the experimenter, she would have gained the same
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knowledge. In contrast, for other kinds of knowledge, the child is heavily or entirely dependent
on the trustworthiness or cooperativeness of another person. For example, when children learn a
new name for an unfamiliar object, they have no way of discovering for themselves the accuracy of
this information. The same is true when they are told about a past or future event remote from their
own direct experience. On the one hand, the transparency of the knowing process in our tasks might
make it less likely that children hold tentatively knowledge gained indirectly. On the other hand,
children may be more trusting of knowledge gained from others when they learn conventional
knowledge. Either way, there may be interesting and important differences in the developmental
course of truth assessments of socially constructed knowledge, compared with knowledge which
in principle at least can be checked against physical reality. More broadly, the source-monitoring
activity that children reveal in their confidence in knowledge gained from different sources, and
possibly also in their explicit source reports, may vary for different knowledge domains.
The second basis of children’s uncertainty in knowledge gained indirectly from others involves
complex processes of source identification and evaluation. In line with the strong explanation,
children saw the specific implications of the speaker’s doubt about his or her own access. Children
more frequently accepted that it could be the other toy when the experimenter expressed doubt
about his access than when Mole expressed doubt about the toy’s identity. Four- to 5-year-olds
maintained this differentiation between experimenter’s and Mole’s doubt after a delay, but 3 to
4-year-olds did not.
We conclude that children aged between 3 and 5 years engage in increasingly sophisticated
source-monitoring activity, identifying the source of their knowledge and making appropriate
evaluations of its reliability. In our task, this involved taking into account the speaker’s source of
knowledge and making inferences from that about the likely truth of what the speaker told them.
This is all the more impressive given that source monitoring was not triggered by an explicit
question “How do you know . . .?” but merely by questions about knowledge content: “Which one
is it?” or “Could it be the other one?” The exception to this sophisticated pattern of responding
was the small group of 3-year-olds in Experiment 1 (mean age 3–7), who showed over-confidence
in knowledge gained from the speaker. Like the older children, these young ones nearly always
denied that it could be the other toy when they had identified the toy for themselves, but unlike
the older ones they did so no less frequently when they had been told the toy’s identity. Of course,
had these young children subsequently seen for themselves that the toy’s property was not as the
experimenter said, they would have updated their belief appropriately (Robinson, Mitchell, &
Nye, 1995). Older children, however, showed a more subtle understanding that knowledge gained
from the experimenter could have been false. They accepted the possibility of its falsity even in
the absence of contradicting direct evidence. Note that our results do not allow the conclusion that
this more subtle understanding is gained only at 4 years of age, since it was found in the samples
in Experiment 2 that included a mix of 3- and 4-year-olds.
The possibility was raised earlier that explicit understanding of sources of knowledge might
be neither necessary nor sufficient for realising the significance of the speaker’s doubt about his
input. The findings of Experiment 1 provide no support for explicit understanding being insuffi-
cient: Children who responded correctly to the explicit source questions also tended to respond
correctly to the doubt questions. However, the results raise the possibility that explicit under-
standing of knowledge sources might not be necessary for appropriate uncertainty in knowledge
gained from another person compared with knowledge gained directly: Some explicit source fail-
ers did show such relative uncertainty. In this respect, children revealed working understanding
of their knowledge sources without necessarily revealing verbally explicit understanding. When
children are expected to comment explicitly on how they know, as in Experiment 1 and in classic
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theory of mind studies (e.g., Wimmer et al., 1988), or when children are asked to predict how
they could find out (e.g., O’Neill, Astington, & Flavell, 1992), limitations in their understanding
are highlighted. In the present doubt task, in contrast, children focused on the identity of the
toy in the tunnel. From the pattern of responses to the doubt and repeated identity questions,
we drew inferences about children’s access to source-specifying information and evaluation of
their sources of knowledge. Examined in this indirect way, we found little fault with older 3- and
4-year-olds’ understanding. Their pattern of responding was broadly similar to that we would
expect from adults in an age-appropriate task. A question for further research concerns the devel-
opmental relationship between these two levels of understanding, given that our results suggest
the possibility of a developmental sequence in which ability to adjust certainty judgements based
on information regarding source may temporarily outstrip explicit differentiation of knowledge
sources. More broadly, the question to ask may be: How do children come to reflect on sources
of knowledge, and what advantages do they gain from such reflection?
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